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Abstract
This paper explores the use of fuzzy regression-discontinuity design in the context
where multiple treatments are applied at the threshold. The identification result shows
that, under a very strong assumption of equality of treatment probability changes at
the cutoff point, a difference in fuzzy discontinuity identify a treatment effect of inter-
est. Using the data from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), we apply this
identification strategy to evaluate the causal effect of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on
health care access and utilization of old Americans. We find results suggesting that the
implementation of the Affordable Care Act has led to an increase in the hospitalization
rate of elderly American–5% more hospitalization. It has caused a minor increase of
cost-related direct barrier to access to care–3.6% increase in the probability of delaying
care for cost reasons. The ACA has also exacerbated cost-related barriers to follow-up
and continuity care–7% more elderly couldn’t afford prescriptions, 7% more couldn’t
see a specialist and, 5.5% more couldn’t afford a follow-up visit- as result of ACA.
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1 Introduction
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) is the most important change in U.S. health care
policy since the creation of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965. The aim of the ACA
was to increase the number of insured people, improve the quality of care, and control
health care costs. Although coverage gains from the ACA implementation are well
documented (e.g. Courtemanche et al. 2017b and Frean et al. 2017), relatively little is
known about its effects on access to care and health care services utilization. The main
empirical challenge in estimating such effects is the identification problem that arises
because many parts of the ACA overlapped with the previous existing Medicare and
Medicaid programs.
The contribution of this paper is both theoretical and empirical. First, we propose
an identification and estimation method to isolate and estimate the partial effect of
the treatment of interest in scenarios in which multiple treatments are assigned in a
fuzzy manner at the same cutoff. We call this new methodology “fuzzy difference-in-
discontinuities”.1 Second, we use this methodology to recover the ceteris paribus effect
of the ACA on access to care and health care services utilization using data on an
important segment of the population: seniors at age 65. We exploit the fact that at
age 65 there is a sudden change in the ACA and Medicare eligibility and enrollment,
and compare health-care-related outcomes among seniors just before and just after the
age of 65 (as in Card et al. 2008), and before and after the ACA was introduced.2
Our “fuzzy difference-in-discontinuities” methodology relies on the availability of a
panel data or pooled cross-sections sample of the population where at least one cohort
is eligible to all the policies and others are eligible to all but the policy of interest. Our
identification results show that, under a strong assumption of equality of treatments
probabilities at the cutoff, a fuzzy difference-in-discontinuities identifies the treatment
effect of interest. In the case where the probabilities of treatment are not equal, point
identification of the treatment effect using the fuzzy difference-in-discontinuities is im-
possible. We propose an estimable bound of the treatment effect under milder assump-
tions. Our identification results are widely applicable and suggest some caution when
applying before and after methodology in presence of fuzzy discontinuities.
Our methodology extents existing works on regression discontinuity and the use of
“before-and-after” methodologies. By showing that a fuzzy difference-in-discontinuities
identifies a local average treatment effect, we propose results similar to those in Hahn
1In naming this methodology fuzzy difference-in-discontinuities we follow Grembi et al. (2016), who pro-
posed a “difference-in-discontinuities” approach that combines features of the regression discontinuity and
the difference-in-differences designs. As we will mention below, our methodology generalizes Grembi et al.
(2016)’s results. The econometric problem we -and Grembi et al.- are dealing with can be viewed as a spe-
cific case of the general question of the evaluation of the pure effect of a policy intervention in presence of
confounding interventions. It can be related to the literature of competing risk in survival analysis (see Fine
and Gray (1999) for a description of competing risk models). In survival analysis, the end of life may occur
because of one of the risks, while in economics the change in the outcomes may come from the policy of
interest or a confounding one. The main difficulty in economics is that treatment decision is most of the
time endogenous and their effects are heterogenous. How the existence of a confounding policy affects an-
other policy evaluation method such as PSM, diff-in-diffs, synthetic control matching or, IV is left for future
research.
2As we will mention below, we basically combine Card et al. (2008)’s fuzzy regression discontinuity design
and a difference-in-differences design.
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et al. (2001), but generalizes them to multiple treatments. Grembi et al. (2016) propose
and implement a sharp “difference-in-discontinuities” estimator that exploits “before-
and-after” and discontinuous policy variation.3 Our identification results extent their
results to the case of a fuzzy discontinuities. The use of the potential outcomes frame-
work enables us to clarify conditions under which a particular treatment of interest
can be identified when many treatments are applied (as in Gilraine (2017)). Our re-
sults show that fuzziness of treatment assignment leads to very restrictive identification
condition and therefore should not be ignored.
There is a vast and growing literature on the evaluation of the ACA. In this literature
the coverage gains from the ACA’s implementation are well documented.4 However,
relatively little is known about the effects of the ACA on access to care and health care
services utilization, this despite the fact that the expansion of health insurance coverage
is expected to have increased the capacity of a larger proportion of the population to
pay for health care services.5 Some studies have looked at the effect of a specific aspect
of the ACA -such as Medicaid expansion- on the access to care in some US states (see
for instance Sommers et al. 2016 and Courtemanche et al. 2017a). Sommers et al.
(2016) use own-collected data from Kentucky, Arkansas an Texas, and a differences-in-
differences specification to asses changes in access to care among low-income adults after
2 full years of the ACA implementation. They find that Kentucky’s Medicaid program
and Arkansas’s private option were associated with significant increases in access to
primary care among low-income adults. Courtemanche et al. (2017a) confirms that
the ACA increased health insurance coverage in states that expanded Medicaid, and
also look at the ability of providers of health care services to keep up with demand.
Importantly, they find that the ambulance response times increased substantially with
the implementation of the ACA, which is consistent with a supply-adjustment cost
coming from an increase in the demand.
This paper contributes to this literature by providing new evidence on the effects of
the ACA on health care services utilization by older Americans. Our findings suggest
that the ACA exacerbated cost-related access barriers to health care for seniors. The
implementation of the ACA in 2014 coincided with more individuals at age 65 delaying
care, not being able to see a specialist, or having no access to continuity of care for costs
reasons. In 2014, 3.6% more individuals who reached age 65 were likely to delay care
due to costs. The ACA had no overall effect on other measures of access to care such as
getting care or seeing a doctor at least once during the previous year. However, within
individual ethnicity, we observe a heterogeneity in the ACA’s effects. The ACA sharply
increased the proportion of Black non-Hispanics aged 65 who saw a doctor during the
previous year by 36.7%. As for health care access, more Hispanics couldn’t have access
to care during the previous year for costs reasons. The ACA also increased utilization
of health care service as measured by hospital over-night stay, a change that is mainly
driven by a 5.1% increase in hospitalization for White non-Hispanic.
The ACA also affected other cost-related aspects to care. We find that overall, the
3See also Leonardi and Pica (2013), who also combine a regression discontinuity design with a difference-
in-difference approach and Benedetto and Paola (2018) who use a diff-in-discs to study the effect of term
limits on voter turnout in local Italian elections.
4A descriptive study of Cohen et al. (2016) shows for instance that the ACA has reduced the uninsured
rate from 16.0% in 2010 to 9.1% in 2015.
5In a recent review, Manchikanti et al. (2017) found that access to care seems to have diminished under
the ACA law.
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proportion of individuals who couldn’t afford to pay prescription drugs increased by
7.0%. This effect is heterogeneous by ethnicity and education level. The proportion of
Hispanics who could not afford drugs increased by 23.3% while the proportion of White
non-Hispanics increased by 6.7%. The proportion of individuals with at least some
college education who couldn’t afford to pay prescription drugs increased by 11.4%.
Access to continuity care was also affected with an increase in the proportion of those
who couldn’t afford to see a specialist, and have a follow-up treatment, by 7.2%, and
5.5%, respectively. The increased in cost-related barriers to continuity was more ap-
parent for high school drop-out, and inability to afford to see a specialist was more
prevalent for White non-Hispanics (7.3% more) and 15.1% more individuals form Mi-
norities couldn’t afford follow-up visit.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the US in-
stitutional background with an emphasis on the ACA and changes induce to Medicare.
Section 3 presents the theoretical framework for the identification of the effect of the
ACA on seniors health care access and utilization. The results of our empirical inves-
tigations are discussed in Section 4, and Section 5 provides a discussion of the results
and a conclusion.
2 Institutional Background
The ACA introduced significant changes into the U.S. national insurance program–
Medicare and Medicaid. These changes intended to reduce Medicare costs, expand
access to health care services, promote quality of care, and expand drug coverage. Prior
to the ACA, at age 65 people who worked 40 quarters or more in covered employment
were eligible to Medicare, and could also be eligible for Medicaid if they had low-income.
These eligibility conditions are maintained with the ACA.
Medicare (and the ACA’s Medicare version) has four parts. Hospital insurance
(Part A) provides broad coverage of inpatient expenses, including not only hospital
visits, but inpatient care in skilled nursing facilities, hospice care and home health
services. The coverage is free of charge. Part B or medical insurance covers medical
services including physician and nursing fees, and also preventive services. Enrollees
pay a modest monthly premium. Advantage (Part C) provided by private insurance;
it covers the essential of Part A and Part B benefits plus urgent and emergency care
services. The monthly premiums vary widely across private insurers.6 Finally, Part D
– prescription drug coverage was enacted in 2003 to reduce costs, increase efficiency,
and increase access to prescription medications for seniors and disabled persons.
In 2010, the U.S. government enacted the ACA with three main objectives: in-
creasing the number of insured, improving the quality of care, and controlling health
care costs. The ACA brought changes and improvements to Medicare and Medicaid.
For example, the ACA has gradually reduced payments to Medicare private insurance
companies (Part C): on average, the payment amounts per enrollee decreased by about
6% in 2014.7
6See https://www.medicareresources.org/medicare-benefits/medicare-advantage/
7Before 2014 the government paid Medicare Advantage plans 9% more per enrollee than it cost to provide
care for the same person under Original Medicare (Part A or Part B) (see https://www.medicarerights.
org/pdf/2012-aca-fact-sheet.pdf).
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One of the major financial burden on Medicare Part D beneficiaries was the so-
called“donut hole”, a coverage gap where beneficiaries are required to pay out-of-pocket
the full cost of their medications. The ACA has gradually reduced the beneficiaries’
cost burden and made the prescription drugs more affordable for Medicare Part D
beneficiaries. The donut hole has been narrowing each year since the ACA was passed
in 2010. In 2011, Medicare part D enrollees in the donut hole were only responsible for
50% of the cost of brand-name drugs. The gap was scheduled to close in 2020, when
beneficiaries would be expected to pay 25% of the cost of all their prescriptions while
they were in the donut hole.
Before the ACA seniors with high-income i.e., seniors with income above $85,000,
and couples above $170,000 were paying higher part B premiums. The ACA has ex-
tended this measure to Medicare Part D by increasing the premiums for higher-income
enrollees. In 2013, around 4% of Part D beneficiaries, and 5% of Part B beneficia-
ries, paid additional premiums based on their income.8 Medicare beneficiaries have
had access to free preventives care services due to the ACA.9 In 2011, over 20 million
individuals with Medicare received free preventive services.
In order to lower Medicare spending and improve the quality of the health services,
starting in 2014 the ACA has changed the fee-for-service payment system that rewards
only quantity to adopt a payment system based on quality and value. For example, hos-
pitals with high readmission rates receive lower payments. Moreover, the new payment
system includes financial incentives for care providers to report on different quality
measures, including quality measures that account for the patient’s experience.
The main ACA coverage provisions took effect by 2014 (Obama, 2016). Figure 1
in Obama (2016) shows that the percentage of individuals without insurance in the
U.S. substantially dropped in 2014. This is consistent with Sommers et al. (2016) and
Courtemanche et al. (2017a), who, as previously mentioned, document an increase in
health insurance coverage as a consequence of the implementation of the ACA. However,
also as previously suggested, it is unclear if this improvement in coverage lead to lesser
the barriers to care. In this paper, we evaluate the impact of ACA on health care
services access and utilization on seniors aged 65 at the year 2014, and focus on the
change occurred between 2012 and 2014.
3 Theory of the Identification and Estimation
in Presence of Multiple Policies
Consider a setting with a population of N individuals, each one born in one of C
cohorts. Let Yic be an outcome (e.g a health related indicator), where i = 1, ..., N
indexes the individuals, and c = 1, ..., C indexes the cohorts. Define Oic as an indicator
variable that identifies whether the individual i born in cohort c is affected by our policy
of interest, which in the empirical application is the ACA. Before the introduction
of Oic, another policy was already in place. Let Mic be an indicator variable that
identifies whether the individual i born in cohort c participated in this second and the
8For more details see https://www.medicareresources.org/basic-medicare-information/
health-reform-and-medicare/ (accessed on July 2018).
9The preventive services include mammograms, prostate cancer screenings, depression screenings, obesity
screenings and counseling, diabetes screenings and screenings for heart disease.
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confounding policy. In our case Mic will be Medicare.
10 The selection of participants
in Mic is partially determined by a forcing variable Xic, and changes discontinuously
at the cutoff t. Specifically, we say that an individual i born in cohort c is treated
–with a higher probability– when Xic > t.
11 In our empirical application Xic is the age
of individual i, and t is age 65.12 The selection of participants in Oic is also partially
determined byXic and t, but also depends on the cohort to which the individual belongs.
In this respect we distinguish between two types of cohorts, old and young, denoted by
L and L¯, respectively, and say that individual i is treated by Oic only if it belongs to
the older cohort, L.
Even though we focus on a fuzzy setting, it is useful to describe the assignment
mechanism previously described for the case Oic and Mic are deterministic. In this
case,
Oic =
{
1 if Xic > t and c ∈ L
0 otherwise
(1)
and
Mic =
{
1 if Xic > t
0 otherwise
(2)
Define Yic(o,m) as the potential outcome of individual i from cohort c if Oic = o and
Mic = m, where m, o ∈ {0, 1}, with 1 corresponding to being treated and 0 otherwise.
By (1) and (2) the observed outcome is therefore equal to
Yic = OicMicYic(1, 1) +Oic(1−Mic)Yic(1, 0)
+ (1−Oic)MicYic(0, 1) + (1−Oic)(1−Mic)Yic(0, 0). (3)
In this setting, we aim at identifying the causal effect of Oic on Yic. We focus on
the average treatment effect of Oic at t, that we denoted by ATEO(t), and define as
ATEO(t) = E(Yic(1, 1)− Yic(0, 1)|Xic = t) (4)
If Oic would be the only treatment changing at t, the cross-sectional regression
discontinuity estimator would identify the average treatment effect of Oic at t. However,
in our setting this estimator will lead to a biased estimate of the ATEO(t) because of
the impossibility of separating the effect of Oic from the effect of Mic.
Define ATE(t) as the cross-sectional regression discontinuity estimator and let
ATEM (t) be the effect of Mic before Oic. In the case of a sharp discontinuity, Grembi
et al. (2016) showed that ATEO(t) can be identified using what they call a difference-in-
discontinuities estimator. Specifically, they show that ATEO(t) = ATE(t)−ATEM (t).
However, in a fuzzy scenario it is reasonable to think that this result does not hold any-
more –without any additional assumptions. As suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010),
in many settings of economic interest, the cutoff only partly determines the treatment
10Or, equivalently, the part of Medicare existing before the ACA.
11That the treatment status is partially determined by a forcing variable Xic means that individuals for
which Xic < t may also be treated by the policy. This makes the participation in the program fuzzy.
12Note that having Medicare (or the ACA) before 65 is also possible (as long as other conditions –as
disability– are met), some seniors keep their work insurance after 65, so participation in both programs is
fuzzy.
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status. It is therefore possible that the change in the probability of participation differs
over time and over policies.13
In the following section we investigate assumptions under which the difference in
the fuzzy discontinuities identifies a policy-relevant quantity when multiple treatments
are applied at the same cutoff. As previously mentioned, our theoretical framework
follows Hahn et al. (2001)’s model and extends it to multiple treatments using panel
or pooled cross-sectional data with a possibility of heterogeneous treatment effects or
sample selection.
3.1 Fuzzy Difference-in-Discontinuities: Identification
Let us define, borrowing the notation from Hahn et al. (2001), the limits Z+ =
lim
x→t+
E[Zic|Xic = x], Z− = lim
x→t−
E[Zic|Xic = x] and, Z = lim
x→tE[Zic|Xic = x], where Zic
is any random variable.
To identify the causal effect of Oic, we consider the following estimand,
τFRDO =
Y + − Y −
T+ − T− −
Y¯ + − Y¯ −
M¯+ − M¯− (5)
where Y¯ + = lim
x→c+
E[Yic|Xic = x, c ∈ L¯], Y¯ − = lim
x→t−
E[Yic|Xic = x, c ∈ L¯], M¯+ =
lim
x→c+
E[Mic|Xic = x, c ∈ L¯], M¯− = lim
x→t−
E[Mic|Xic = x, c ∈ L¯], and Tic = OicMic.
We call τFRDO in (5) a “fuzzy difference-in-discontinuities” estimator because, as
Grembi et al. (2016)’s estimator, it rests on the intuition of combining a difference-
in-differences strategy and a regression discontinuity design, but in our setting, the
regression discontinuity design is fuzzy.
Now we provide a set of assumptions under which τFRDO in (5) identifies the ATEO(t)
in (4). In our empirical application this means establishing the conditions under which
τFRDO identifies the local ATE of the ACA at age 65. All the assumptions will be
conditional on Xic being in the neighborhood of the cutoff t.
Assumption 1. The conditional expectation of each potential outcomes is contin-
uous in x at t.
This first assumption is standard in the regression discontinuity literature. It says
that the conditional expectation of all potential outcomes are continuous at the cutoff
point.
Assumption 2. Mic and Oic are independent of Yic(o,m), where o,m = 0, 1.
This second assumption states that the decision to take the treatment is independent
of the potential outcomes, i.e., that individuals cannot self-select into the treatment
based on their expected benefits. This assumption will be relaxed later to allow for
some self-selection.
13The study of the cases of imperfect take-up by program participants or scenarios in which other factors
(observable or unobservable) affect the probability of program participation is crucial for the practitioners.
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Assumption 3. The effect of the confounding policyMic in the case of no treatment
(Oic = 0) is constant over units: Yic1(0, 1) − Yic1(0, 0) = Yic2(0, 1) − Yic2(0, 0) for any
c2 ∈ L and c1 ∈ L¯ = C r L where C is the set of all cohorts in the sample.
In Assumption 3 the effect of the confounding policy is required to be the same
before and after the ACA. In other words, it requires observations just below and just
above the cutoff to be on a (local) parallel trend in the absence of the policy of interest.
This assumption is similar to the standard identifying assumption for difference-in-
differences specifications (Abadie 2005).
Assumption 4. (i) The limits O+ = lim
x→t+
E[Oic|Xic = x], O− = lim
x→t−
E[Oic|Xic =
x], M+ = lim
x→t+
E[Mic|Xic = x] and M− = lim
x→t−
E[Mic|Xic = x] exist
(ii) O+ 6= O− and M+ 6= M−
(iii) Oic and Mic are independent and T
+ = M+O+ 6= M−O− = T−
Assumptions 4.(i) and 4.(ii) are standard regression discontinuity assumptions for
the two policies. Assumption 4.(iii) is specific to our setting, and states that Oic and
Mic must be independent. This assumption is similar to that used in competing risk
survival analysis, and, specifically, to the result that if the cause of death (corresponding
to treatments in our case) are not independent, the joint survival function cannot be
identified (see for instance Crowder 1991, Crowder 2000). In our case, without the
independence assumption, quantities like E[OicMic|Xic] cannot be identified from the
data because of lack of information on the joint distribution of M and O.
Assumption 5. The discontinuity in the probability of treatment is the same for
all policies at the threshold i.e. O+ −O− = T+ − T− = M+ −M−.
Assumption 5 is completely new, and its formulation is one of the contributions
of this paper. It requires that the discontinuity in the probability of selection of each
policy to be the same as well as the joint probability of selection. This assumption is
clearly satisfied when the discontinuity is sharp. Therefore, our identification results
generalize those of Grembi et al. (2016) to the fuzzy case with heterogenous treatment
effects. The following theorem gives conditions for the identification of the treatment
of interest.
Theorem 1. (Identification of the fuzzy Difference-in-Discontinuities estimator): Sup-
pose that Assumptions 1 to 5 hold; then the fuzzy Difference-in-Discontinuities estimator
τFRDO defined in (5) identifies the average treatment effect, ATEO(t) in (4).
Proof. From Assumptions 1 and 2 first note that
Y + − Y − = lim
x→t+
E[Yic|Xic = x]− lim
x→t−
E[Yic|Xic = x]
= (T+ − T−)(Y (1, 1)− Y (0, 1)) + (O+ −O−)(Y (1, 0)− Y (0, 0))
+ (M+ −M−)(Y (0, 1)− Y (0, 0))− (T+ − T−)(Y (1, 0)− Y (0, 0)) (6)
and
Y¯ + − Y¯ − = lim
x→t+
E[Yic|Xic = x, c ∈ L¯]− lim
x→t−
E[Yic|Xic = x, c ∈ L¯]
= (M¯+ − M¯−)(Y¯ (0, 1)− Y¯ (0, 0)) (7)
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Applying Assumption 3 to equation (7) and dividing each of the previous equations
by T+ − T− and M¯+ − M¯− we have
τFRDO =
Y + − Y −
T+ − T− −
Y¯ + − Y¯ −
M¯+ − M¯−
= ATEO(t)− [1− O
+ −O−
T+ − T− ](Y (1, 0)− Y (0, 0)) (8)
− [1− M
+ −M−
T+ − T− ](Y (0, 1)− Y (0, 0)).
Under Assumptions 1 to 5, the right-hand side of (8) becomes ATEO(t). This means
that the fuzzy Difference-in-Discontinuities estimator identifies the local causal effect
of the ACA.
Note that the proof of Theorem 1 comprises two moments: first, Assumptions 1 to 4
lead to the difference-in-discontinuity expression in equation (8); then, when Assump-
tion 5 is applied, all the terms other than ATEO(t) are cancelled.
Theorem 1 provides conditions allowing us to identify the local causal effect of the
treatment of interest. Assumption 5, while being strong, is a testable assumption: the
three terms to which Assumption 5 imposes a strict equality represent the discontinuities
in program participation at the threshold.
Note that in empirical applications, Assumptions 1 to 4 (i) and (ii) can easily be
satisfied. As previously mentioned, these assumptions are similar to those used in
a standard regression discontinuity design. However, the independence assumption
between the two treatment –Assumption 4.(iii)– is strong, and, unfortunately, non-
testable. The following assumption relaxes it, and imposes a sort of dominance of the
treatment of interest on the confounding treatment.
Assumption 4’. (i) The limits O+ = lim
x→t+
E[Oic|Xic = x], O− = lim
x→t−
E[Oic|Xic =
x], M+ = lim
x→t+
E[Mic|Xic = x] and M− = lim
x→t−
E[Mic|Xic = x] exist
(ii) O+ 6= O− and M+ 6= M−
(iii) Oic ≥Mic almost surely and O+ −O− = M+ −M−
The following proposition proposes an alternative set of conditions under which our
fuzzy Difference-in-Discontinuities estimator identifies the treatment effect of interest.
Proposition 1. (Identification of the fuzzy Difference-in-Discontinuities estimator with-
out independence): Suppose that Assumptions 1 to 3 and 4’ hold; then the fuzzy Difference-
in-Discontinuities estimator τFRDO defined in (5) identifies the average treatment effect,
ATEO(t) in (4).
Proof. Note that under Assumption 4.(iii), E[Mic|Xic = x] = P (Mic = 1|Xic = x) =
P (Mic = 1, Oic = 1|Xic = x) + P (Mic = 1, Oic = 0|Xic = x). Hence, E[Mic|Xic =
x] = P (Mic = 1|Xic = x) = P (Mic = 1, Oic = 1|Xic = x) given that Oic ≥ Mic. Thus,
E[Mic|Xic = x] = P (Mic = 1|Xic = x) = P (Mic = 1, Oic = 1|Xic = x) = E[Tic|Xic =
x]. This implies that O+−O− = M+−M− is enough for Assumption 5 to be verified.
The assumptions under which Proposition 1 holds are slightly less restrictive than
those for Theorem 1. Moreover, and importantly, the restrictions Oic ≥ Mic and
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O+−O− = M+−M− are empirically testable. These two relations together imply that
almost the same group of individuals should participated to the programs at the cutoff.
The strict equality in Assumption 4’.(iii), even though less restrictive than Assumption
5, is however still very strong, as it means that in case of strict inclusion the difference
on both side of the cutoff should be similar. If there is selection on unobservable, the
assumption may not hold. The following assumption provides a more realistic and
feasible alternative to Assumption 5.
Assumption 5’. The difference in the discontinuity in the probability of treatment
of the confounding policy is bounded at the threshold, i.e. ‖1−M
+ −M−
T+ − T− ‖ ≤ ρ˜ where ρ˜
is the smallest ρ such that ‖1−M
+ −M−
T+ − T− ‖ ≤ ρ and Y (1, 1)−Y (0, 1) = Y (1, 0)−Y (0, 0).
Assumption 5’ restricts the differences in the discontinuity at the threshold to be
bounded. Under Assumption 4, the difference is always bounded. We also assume
that the effect of the second treatment would had been the same with or without the
confounding treatment. The following theorem relaxes Assumption 5, which leads to
the inability to point identify the treatment effect of interest using a fuzzy diff-in-discs.
Instead, we propose estimable bounds.
Theorem 2. (Bounds for the ATEO): Under Assumptions 1 to 4 and 5’ the average
treatment effect ATEO(t) in (4) can be bounded by a function of the fuzzy Difference-in-
Discontinuities estimator τFRDO and an estimator of the confounding treatment effect.
Specifically, if ATEM (t) ≥ 0 then
T+ − T−
O+ −O−
[
τFRDO − ρ˜ATEM (t)
] ≤ ATEO(t) ≤ T+ − T−
O+ −O−
[
τFRDO + ρ˜ATEM (t)
]
(9)
otherwise
T+ − T−
O+ −O−
[
τFRDO + ρ˜ATEM (t)
] ≤ ATEO(t) ≤ T+ − T−
O+ −O−
[
τFRDO − ρ˜ATEM (t)
]
(10)
Proof. As shown in the proof of Theorem 1, when Assumption 1 to 4 are satisfied,
τFRDO = ATEO(t)− [1−
O+ −O−
T+ − T− ](Y (1, 0)− Y (0, 0)) (11)
− [1− M
+ −M−
T+ − T− ](Y (0, 1)− Y (0, 0)).
Under the assumption 5’ that Oic would had the same treatment effect without Mic,
we can also say that
ATEO(t) =
T+ − T−
O+ −O−
[
τFRDO + [1−
M+ −M−
T+ − T− ]ATEM (t)
]
(12)
And it is easy to see that (12) implies (9), when ATEM (t) is positive, and (10) when
ATEM (t) is negative.
The upper and the lower bounds in (9) and (10) are quantities that can be estimated.
The these bounds are the smallest possible, i.e., they are sharp. Indeed, we can obtain
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a consistent estimate of ρ˜ by estimating all elements in
M+ −M−
T+ − T− .
The bounds obtained in Theorem 2 are under the assumption of independence be-
tween the two treatments. In the following proposition, this assumption is relaxed and
replaced by the assumption of inclusion of one treatment in the other. Moreover, we
allow the changes in the probabilities of treatment to be different at the cutoff.
Proposition 2. (ATEO without independence): Under Assumptions 1 to 3, 4.(i),
4.(ii), Oic ≥ Mic almost surely and Y (1, 1)− Y (0, 1) = Y (1, 0)− Y (0, 0) the ATEO(t)
is point identified by τFRDO
M+ −M−
O+ −O− = ATEO(t)
Proof. Note that under Assumptions Oic ≥ Mic and Y (1, 1) − Y (0, 1) = Y (1, 0) −
Y (0, 0), we have that ρ˜ = 0, and the result follows form (12).
The result in Proposition 2 show an alternative way to point identify the treatment
effect using a transformation of the difference in discontinuity estimator.
We have so far presented partial and point identification results assuming that there
was no selection based on potential outcomes (i.e. Assumption 2). This limited its
applicability. The following assumption helps us to generalize our identification results
to scenarios with selection on unobservables.
Assumption 6. (i) (Yic(o,m)− Yic(o,m), Oic(x),Mic(x)) is jointly independent of
Xic near the cutoff t.
(ii) There exists an ε > 0 such that Oic(t+ e) ≥ Oic(t− e), Mic(t+ e) ≥Mic(t− e) and
Tic(t+ e) ≥ Tic(t− e) for all 0 < e < ε.
(iii) There exists an ε > 0 such that for e > 0 sufficiently small (i.e. such that 0 < e < ε
) P ({Mic1(t+e)−Mic1(t−e) = 1}) = P ({Mic2(t+e)−Mic2(t−e) = 1}) for any c2 ∈ L
and c1 ∈ L¯ = C r L.
Assumption 6.(i) means that the choice of the cutoff is exogenous. It allows for
selection based on potential outcomes. Assumption 6.(ii) is similar to the monotonicity
assumption in the instrumental variable literature. Assumption 6.(iii) is completely
new, and states that the compiler set for the confounding policy should be of the same
size for all cohorts in the neighborhood of the cutoff.
Theorem 3. (LATE for the fuzzy Difference-in-Discontinuities): Suppose that As-
sumptions 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 hold. Then τFRDO identifies a local average treatment effect,
i.e.,
τFRDO = lim
e→0
E(Yic(1, 1)−Yic(0, 1)|{Oic(t+e)−Oic(t−e) = 1}, {Mic(t+e)−Mic(t−e) = 1})
(13)
Proof. Let us consider the following quantity
A = E[Yic|Xic = t+ e]− E[Yic|Xic = t− e]
= E[OicMicYic(1, 1) +Oic(1−Mic)Yic(1, 0)|Xic = t+ e]
+ E[(1−Oic)MicYic(0, 1) + (1−Oic)(1−Mic)Yic(0, 0)|Xic = t+ e]
− E[OicMicYic(1, 1) +Oic(1−Mic)Yic(1, 0)|Xic = t− e]
− E[(1−Oic)MicYic(0, 1) + (1−Oic)(1−Mic)Yic(0, 0)|Xic = t− e] (14)
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Using an argument similar to that in Hahn et al. (2001), Theorem 3, the last expression
is equivalent to
A = E[Yic(1, 1)− Yic(0, 1)|{Oic(t+ e)−Oic(t− e) = 1}, {Mic(t+ e)−Mic(t− e) = 1}] (15)
× (E[Tic|Xic = t+ e]− E[Tic|Xic = t− e])
+ E[Yic(1, 0)− Yic(0, 0)|{Oic(t+ e)−Oic(t− e) = 1}](E[Oic|Xic = t+ e]− E[Oic|Xic = t− e])
+ E[Yic(0, 1)− Yic(0, 0)|{Mic(t+ e)−Mic(t− e) = 1}](E[Mic|Xic = t+ e]− E[Mic|Xic = t− e])
− E[Yic(1, 0)− Yic(0, 0)|{Oic(t+ e)−Oic(t− e) = 1}](E[Tic|Xic = t+ e]− E[Tic|Xic = t− e]).
Applying a similar argument to the older cohort, we also have that
B = E[Y¯ic|Xic = t+ e]− E[Y¯ic|Xic = t− e]
= E[Yic(0, 1)− Yic(0, 0)|{Mic(t+ e)−Mic(t− e) = 1}, c ∈ L¯]
× E[Mic|Xic = t+ e, c ∈ L¯)− E(Mic|Xic = t− e, c ∈ L¯] (16)
Under Assumptions 6 and 3, we have that E[Yic(0, 1)−Yic(0, 0)|{Mic(t+e)−Mic(t−e) =
1}, c ∈ L¯] = E[Yic(0, 1) − Yic(0, 0)|{Mic(t + e) −Mic(t − e) = 1}] for all 0 < e < ε. In
addition, dividing A by E[Tic|Xic = t+ e]− E[Tic|Xic = t− e] and B by E[Mic|Xic =
t+e, c ∈ L¯)−E(Mic|Xic = t−e, c ∈ L¯], letting e goes to zero, and applying Assumption
5, we obtain (13).
We have shown that the use of a difference-in-discontinuities design can help to
separate the effect of a policy of interest from a confounding treatments. This can be
achieved when there is or not selection on the returns at the threshold. Theorem 3
shows that our fuzzy difference-in-discontinuities estimator identifies the LATE at the
discontinuity point.
Regarding our empirical application, note that we are in a situation where eligibility
does not mean participation, since the choice of taking Medicare before or after the ACA
can be driven by factors that are unobservable to the econometrician but known by the
agent. The causal effect we are therefore going to estimate can be best described as a
LATE. The compliers group is formed by the elderly whose decision to use Medicare or
the ACA’s version of Medicare is driven by their eligibility because of their age.
The identification results presented in this section show conditions for point identi-
fication of ATEO(t). We showed that point identification can occur in two scenarios.
First, the two treatments are independent, and the changes in the treatment probabil-
ity for both treatments are equal at the cutoff point. Second, the two treatments are
not independent, but the pre-existing treatment is included in the treatment of inter-
est when its application starts. Additionally, we can relax the assumption of equality
of treatment probability changes at the cutoff point and add an assumption of the
additivity of the treatment effects (Y (1, 1)− Y (0, 1) = Y (1, 0)− Y (0, 0)).
In all the cases, our result of point identification using a fuzzy diff-in-discs relies
on strong assumptions. For instance, the independence assumption is not testable
(Crowder 1991). In the case of strict inclusion of the pre-existing treatment in the
treatment of interest, the assumption of equality of treatment probability changes at
the cutoff point means that the difference should stay exactly the same above and
below the cutoff. When the equality of treatment probability changes assumption is
relaxed, an additivity assumption is required for point identification, ruling out the
case of strict superadditivity (Y (1, 1) − Y (0, 1) > Y (1, 0) − Y (0, 0)) or subadditivity
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(Y (1, 1)−Y (0, 1) < Y (1, 0)−Y (0, 0)) and the estimator used is not a direct difference-
in-discontinuities estimator.
3.2 Estimation and Inference
The estimation and inference of the effects of the policy mentioned in the previous
section can be done using a reduced form approach or a nonparametric approach. In
this subsection, we present the steps of the nonparametric procedure. The choice of
presenting this approach is linked to its intuitive connection with the identification
results. However, because of several limitations of the existing estimation methods for
our specific case, and to be able to compare our results with those of Card et al. (2008),
in our empirical application we use the reduced form approach. In the next section
we explain how we implement this approach, which essentially consists of a two stages
least square combined with a difference-in-differences style procedure.
The estimation of the treatment effect of interest was obtained using fuzzy difference-
in-discontinuities design via a difference in two ratios. We showed that under Assump-
tions 1 to 5 or 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6, the difference in the ratios
τFRDO =
Y + − Y −
T+ − T− −
Y¯ + − Y¯ −
M¯+ − M¯− (17)
identifies the treatment effect of the relevant policy at X = t. Therefore, to obtain
consistent estimator for τFRDF , we can use consistent estimators of Yˆ
+, Yˆ −, Tˆ+, Tˆ−
ˆ¯Y +, ˆ¯Y −, ˆ¯M+ and ˆ¯M−.
To estimate these quantities it is common to apply some nonparametric regression
techniques (see Hahn et al. (2001), and Porter (2003), Otsu et al. (2015)). The parame-
ters can be estimated by local linear regression estimators, which have better boundary
properties than traditional kernel regression (see for instance Fan 1992), and are optimal
(see for instance Porter 2003).
The estimator for Y + is given by a solution to the following weighted least square
problem, where Yˆ + = aˆ:
(aˆ, bˆ) = argmina,b
∑
i,c∈L:Xic≥t
(Yic − a− b(Xic − t))2K
(
Xic − t
h
)
(18)
where K is the kernel function and h = hN the bandwidth satisfying h→ 0 as N →∞.
The other quantities included in the first ratio on the right of (17) are estimated
using the same type of procedure as in (18). Depending on the quantity we are interested
in, Yic is replaced by Tic. The minimisation is made on Xic ≥ t or Xic ≤ t to get the
upper and lower limit estimators, respectively. Note that in the estimation of this first
ratio we use individuals from the cohort to which both policies are applied.
To obtain the treatment effect of our policy of interest, we need an estimate of the
second ratio on the right of (17). In the estimation of the terms composing this second
ratio we follow a similar procedure to that applied to the elements of the first ratio,
but with only one difference: the sample now consist of those individuals living in the
cohort to which only one policy (the confounding policy) is applied. For instance, the
estimator for Y¯ + is given by solutions to the following weighted least square problems
13
with respect to a i.e. ˆ¯Y + = aˆ,
(aˆ, bˆ) = argmina,b
∑
i,c∈L¯:Xic≥t
(Y¯ic − a− b(Xic − t))2K
(
Xic − t
h
)
(19)
The use of two independent samples to evaluate the two ratios ensure us of the
independence of these quantities. Following Theorem 4 of Hahn et al. (2001), the
asymptotic distribution of the estimator is normally distributed with mean given by
the difference in means of the two ratios, and the variance given by the sum of the
variances. 14 The conventional Wald-type confidence set for τFRDO can be obtained
by estimating asymptotic variances of the non-parametric estimator, or by using an
appropriate bootstrap method.15
The use of this non-parametric approach is implemented via a selection of a smooth-
ing parameter h. In the case of the standard regression discontinuity design, this pa-
rameter can be chosen optimally using data-driven selection methods (see for instance
Imbens and Kalyanaraman 2012 and Calonico et al. 2014). In the case of a fuzzy discon-
tinuity, Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) suggest to proceed as in Imbens and Lemieux
(2008), by estimating two optimal bandwidths, one for the main regression outcome and
one for the treatment. In order to apply this recommendation to our case, we have to
select four optimal bandwidths. The selection of these bandwidths are theoretically
based on homoscedasticity assumptions which may not hold for the panel type data we
have in hand. Moreover, while being optimally chosen by criteria of minimisation of the
integrated mean square error, the effect of the bandwidths choice on inference is also of
interest. Indeed, Calonico et al. (2014) show that confidence interval constructed using
these bandwidths are not valid. They proposed a new theory-based, more robust con-
fidence interval estimators for average treatment effects. To our knowledge, no study
has generalized this theory to difference-in-discontinuities settings. The generalization
of this theory to these settings (sharp and fuzzy), while being important, are left for
future investigation. Thus, given the theoretical limitations of the non-parametric ap-
proach, we restrict our attention to the use of a reduced-form model. We describe this
approach in the next section, in the context of our empirical application.
4 Effect of the Affordable Care Act
As previously mentioned, we use a reduced-form approach to estimate the effect of ACA
on the utilization of health care services by elderly Americans. Besides the theoretical
limitations of the non-parametric approach, the use of a reduced-form enables us to
compare our results with those by Card et al. (2008).
We restrict our attention to linear regression functions using observations distributed
within a distance of 10 years on both sides of the age 65 cutoff, before and after the
14The speed of convergence is n
2
5 , and h = Op(n
− 15 ) where n = min(N1, N2) with N1 the number of
individuals in P and N2 the number of individuals in L¯. The asymptotic results can be established with a
balanced sample in the two cohorts. If the samples are not balanced we can drop the excess number randomly.
15Another alternative may be to use the empirical likelihood-based inference methods proposed by Otsu
et al. (2015) which circumvent the asymptotic variance estimation issues and have data-determined shapes.
However, the procedure needs to be extended to account for the panel data nature of our data set that may
come with heteroscedasticity issues.
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implementation of the ACA. We also explore robustness to the inclusion of second-
order polynomial terms of age along with interactions and use a smaller bandwidth. As
discussed below, the estimated discontinuities are generally robust.
Specifically, we estimate the following model
Yic = α1 +α2Mic +α3Oic +α4Dc + βMicOic + τ
FRD
O DcMicOic + f(Xic, Dc) + ηic (20)
and Mic = τ0 +τ1X
∗
ic+τ2Dc+τ3DcX
∗
ic+f(Xic, Dc)+ ςic and Oic = pi0 +pi1X
∗
ic+pi2Dc+
pi3DcX
∗
ic + f(Xic, Dc) +υic, where Xic is the age of individual i of the cohort c, X
∗
ic is a
dummy equal to one if this individual is above the 65 age threshold, Dc is an indicator
for the post-ACA period, and f(Xic, Dc) is a polynomial function of Xic whose terms
include interactions with Dc. As the design is not sharp, Mic, the participation to
medicare, and Oic, the participation to ACA, are only partly determined by crossing
the age 65 cutoff. Indeed, as previously mentioned, some individuals are eligible to
Medicare before 65 for disability reasons, and after 65 eligibility is subject to having
worked at least 40 quarters in covered employment. The estimator of the coefficient
τFRDO is our fuzzy difference-in-discontinuities estimator, and we obtain it through a
two stage least squares type estimation.16
We consider several outcome variables (Yic), all related to health care access or
use: whether the person delayed care last year for cost reasons, whether the person
did not get care last year for cost reasons, whether the person saw a doctor or went
to the hospital last year, whether the person could afford prescription medicine, see a
specialist, follow-up care last year, and whether the person could get appointment soon
enough last year.
4.1 Data
We use survey data from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS).17 In our baseline
specification, we focus on the years 2012 and 2014, the reason being that, as previously
mentioned, even though states varied significantly in their approach to implementing
the ACA, in many states crucial actions were largely put into motion during 2013. Thus,
for those states in which these actions occurred, the year 2013 is a reasonable cutoff
for the ACA implementation. Then, we take the years 2012 and 2014 as representing
two moments in which crucial components related to the ACA had been either not
implemented or implemented.18
For the years 2012 and 2014, the NHIS reports respondents’ birth year and birth
month, and the calendar quarter of the interview. We use this information to identify
the age (in quarters) of the respondents. As in Card et al. (2008), we suppose that
a person who reaches his sixty-fifth birthday in the interview quarter is age 65 and 0
16The model in equation (20) is specific to reflect the general theoretical framework proposed in the previous
section. However, in practice, the implementation of ACA for individuals at age 65, as discussed in the
background section, consists in an extension of existing Medicare benefits. This means that the model
estimated is simpler and given by Yic = α1 + α2Mic + α3Dc + δDc ×Mic + f(Xic, Dc) + ωic, with Mic =
τ0 + τ1X
∗
ic + τ2Dc + τ3Dc ×X∗ic + f(Xic, Dc) + ϕic
17This data can be consulted at https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nhis/
data-questionnaires-documentation.htm
18Because of data use restrictions, specifically regarding information on birth year and birth month of the
people surveyed, we could not include data for the years 2015 and 2016.
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quarters, and assuming a uniform distribution of interview dates, we say that about
one-half of these people will be 0-6 weeks younger than 65, and one-half will be 0-6
weeks older. As previously mentioned, we limit our analysis to people who are over 55
and under 75, and to regions in which most of the States have implemented the ACA
by 2014.19 The final sample size is 25,291 although some outcomes are available only
for a smaller subsample.
4.2 Changes in Insurance Coverage at Age 65 and Years
2012 and 2014
As shown in Section 3.1, the identification of effect of the ACA using our fuzzy difference-
in-discontinuities estimator depends on several assumptions. In this section we discuss
how plausible is that these assumptions are satisfied.
Let us start by noting that participation in both Medicare and ACA is partially
determined by the same threshold for eligibility (people who are least at 65). This was
the first requirement in our setting. Figure I illustrates this claim by showing the age
profiles of health insurance coverage estimated separately for each treatment (the year
2012 for Medicare, plotted with circles, and 2014 for the ACA, plotted with diamonds).
The figure shows that for each treatment, we observe a significant increase in coverage
rates. This suggests that the age threshold at 65 provides a credible source of exogenous
variation in insurance status for both policies.20
Figure I also illustrates a second and most important relation between how likely
is that a person is eligible to Medicare and how likely is that a person is eligible to
the ACA, both at the same 65 threshold: the rise in the share of coverage rate at
age 65 is virtually the same for both treatments. This provides evidence that the
probability of selection into Medicare and ACA are likely the same which is consistent
with Assumption 5.
Table I confirms the results in Figure I by showing the effects of reaching age 65 on
the insurance status for Medicare (Panel A) and the ACA (Panel B) on five insurance-
related variables: the probability of Medicare coverage, the probability of any health
insurance coverage, the probability of private coverage, the probability of two or more
forms of coverage, and the probability that an individual’s primary health insurance
is a managed care program. Column (1) in Panels A and B shows that reaching age
65 significantly increases the probability of having Medicare in 2012 (Panel A) and
2014 (Panel B), and most importantly, that the increase in both probabilities is the
same. Panel C confirms this result by showing the estimates of our fuzzy difference-in-
19In the classification of the regions we follow the categorization in the public data made in the NHIS. This
identifies the 4 four Census Regions (Northeast, Midwest, South and West). In our baseline specification, we
limit our analysis to the Northeast, Midwest, and West regions, which are the regions in which most of the
states had implemented the ACA by 2014 (see the Kaiser Family Foundation, at https://www.kff.org/; see
also https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/resources/primers/medicaidmap). Thus, we exclude
the following States: TX, OK, AR, LA, AL, MS, TN, KY, WV, MD, DE, DC, VA, NC, SC, GA, FL. Because
of data use restrictions, in our main specification we include a few States that have not implemented the
ACA by 2014 (i.e. ID, UT, WY, ME, WI, SD, NE, KS, MO) and exclude a few that have implemented the
AC by 2014 (i.e. AR, LA, KY, WV, MD, DE, DC). Our analysis is however robust to the exclusion of the
Midwest, which we can exclude the following states that have not implemented the ACA by 2014: SD, NE,
KS, MO)
20This also means that Assumptions 4.(i) and 4.(ii) are likely to be satisfied.
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discontinuities estimator where the dependent variable is insurance status. Column (1)
in Panel C shows that the probability of having Medicare is not affected once the ACA
was introduced. Columns (3) to (5) shows that this result holds for the probability of
private coverage, the probability of two or more forms of coverage, and the probability
that an individual’s primary health insurance is a managed care program.
Regarding the assumption about the independence of the two treatments (i.e. As-
sumption 4.(iii)), note that this is a strong assumption. Indeed, two policies using
the same cutoff are most of the time going to complement or substitute to each other.
Importantly, this seems to be the case for the ACA and Medicare. As an alternative,
we propose to rely on Assumption 4’. In this respect, first note that the first part
of Assumption 4’.(iii) is consistent with how the ACA and Medicare are likely to be
related: all 2014 Medicare users are treated by the ACA, which in terms of Oic and
Mic, means that Oic ≥ Mic. As for the second part of Assumption 4’.(iii), since it is
similar to Assumption 5, then, as previously mentioned, results in Table I and Figure
I are consistent with it.
Assumptions 1 and 3 are difficult to test. However, we propose a set of placebo
regressions to evaluate their plausibility. Assumption 3 is similar to the parallel trend
assumption in the difference-in-differences methodology. It stipulates that in absence
of the ACA program, the effect of the Medicare should be the same on the utilization of
health care services. In Tables XXV to XXVII we construct placebo fuzzy difference-
in-discontinuities estimations for cohorts or regions only affected by Medicare at age 65.
Results in Table XXV suggest that if we consider the Midwest and South regions the
difference in the discontinuity in the level of access to care and health service utilization
for seniors at age 65 is not different from zero at any conventional statistical level. More-
over, if we focus on the south region, as in Table XXVI, we have evidence of no change
in cost-related access to care between 2012 and 2014. Our results however suggest a
small but significant reduction in elderly who could nota afford a prescription medicine,
specialist or follow-up visit when only the South Region is consider. Nevertheless, this
result is opposite to what we found in our baseline regressions.
Turning to regions where the ACA was implemented by 2014, Table XXVII shows
fuzzy difference-in-discontinuities estimations for several consecutive groups of years
(previous to 2014). All but two of the differences are statistically not different from
zero. These placebo regressions suggest that Medicare have the same effect irrespective
of the cohorts. Overall, the placebo regressions suggest that Assumption 3 is fair and
can be considered as true in our sample.
Concerning Assumption 1, it is exactly the same as that present in the standard
literature that uses the age 65 in the US as a threshold (see Card et al. (2008) for an
indicative list). As for Assumptions 2 or 6, at least one of them is satisfied. Unfortu-
nately, to the best of our knowledge, there is no test for these assumptions in the panel
data environment. We assume that they hold in our setting.
4.3 Empirical Results
Panel A of Table II presents the fuzzy difference-in-discontinuities estimated effects of
ACA on access to care and health care services utilization of 65 years old Americans.
We consider three self-reported access to care outcomes from the NHIS questionnaires:
(i) “During the past 12 months has medical care been delayed for the individual because
of worry about the cost?” (first column) (ii) “During the past 12 months was there any
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time when the individual needed medical care but did not get it because the individual
could not afford it?” (second column) (iii) Did the individual have at least one doctor
visit in the 12 months? (third column). In the last column, we report the estimated
τFRDO ’s regarding health care services utilization, in particular individuals’ overnight
hospital stays in the previous year.
The results show that, overall, individuals who reached age 65 in the year 2014
were more likely to delay care due to costs (an increase of 3.6% in the probability of
delaying care). However, the estimated fuzzy difference-in-discontinuities coefficients
on the other two access to care outcomes in columns (2) and (3) are not significant at
the standard levels. These results suggest that the effect of ACA on cost-related access
to care was mixed. Regarding health care services utilization, we note a significant
increase of 4.8% in hospitalization rates at 65 years in 2014. Panel B of Table II shows
the effect of ACA on several cost-related access to care outcomes for individuals at age
65. Overall, the proportion of individuals who reported that they couldn’t afford to pay
prescription drugs, see a specialist and have a follow-up treatment increased by 7.0%,
7.2%, and 5.5%, respectively.
We also perform a subgroup analysis considering ethnicity and education. Table III
presents the breakdown of the results by ethnicity. Results reveal that for both whites
(non-hispanic) and minorities (black or hispanic) there is no significant effect of ACA
on either access to care or health care services utilization (first panel of Table III).
Interestingly, we observe a clear heterogeneity in the ACA’s effects within individuals’
ethnicity. The ACA increased the proportion of blacks (non-hispanic) aged 65 who saw
a doctor the previous year by 36.7% and the proportion of whites (non-hispanic) with
a least one hospitalization by 5.1%, but more hispanics couldn’t have access to care the
previous year for costs-related reasons (an increase of 15.6%). Moreover, the results
from panel B of Table III shows that the proportion of whites (non-hispanic) who could
not afford prescription drugs, a specialist visit, as well as a follow-up care increased as
a consequence of the ACA. The proportion of hispanics who could not afford drugs also
increased by 23.3%. Panel B in Table IV shows that the ACA significantly increased
of the proportion of high school dropouts seniors who could not afford a specialist visit
and a follow-up care compared to the more educated seniors. An additional 11.4% of
seniors that had a college education could not afford their prescription drugs.
In short, the results suggest that, in general, the ACA exacerbates cost-related
access barriers for seniors. In 2014, more individuals at age 65 delayed care, could not
see a specialist, or could have access to continuity of care due to costs. This might
be in part due to the fact that the implementation of the ACA is associated with the
increase in Medicare Part B premiums and the reduction of the government’s payment
per enrollee to the private insurance companies. The ACA increased the proportion
of seniors that couldn’t afford prescription drugs. This is somewhat surprising since
the ACA was set to reduce Medicare part D enrollees’ out-of-pocket expenses. The
increase in hospitalization rate might be the effect of paying physicians under the ACA
based on the quality of services provided and penalizing hospitals with high readmission
rates. Interestingly, the ACA significantly improved the access to physicians’ services
to blacks (non-hispanic) and increased hospital stays for white non-hispanic. However,
under the ACA more hispanics were unable to access to care for costs-related reasons.
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4.4 Robustness Checks
Identifying the effect of the ACA on access to care outcomes requires that all other
factors that might affect an individual at 65 years old regarding access to care trend
smoothly (Card et al., 2008). An example of a confounding factor that could affect
individuals’ health outcomes at 65, is the employment status since 65 years old repre-
sents the typical retirement age and employed older adults had better health outcomes
than unemployed older adults (Kachan et al., 2015). This may lead to a biased τFRDO
if employment status has a significant impact on individuals’ health outcomes at the
discontinuity (age 65) and at the year 2014.
The estimated effect of the discontinuity at age 65 on employment status are pre-
sented in Table VI. We consider two employment variables: whether or not an individual
is employed and whether or not an individual is a full-time employee. The results show
non-significant coefficients, which suggests that there are no discontinuities at 65 in
both cases. Figure II illustrates the non-discontinuity at age 65 in employment. We
also perform the same test using different subgroups: ethnicity and education. The
results are presented in Tables IX and X. Again, in all cases with all subgroups the
results show that no evidence of discontinuities in employment. We obtain similar re-
sults with smaller bandwidths (see Table XV). That is, we can rule out employment as
confounding factors in the measurement of the ACA’s effect on access to health care
services.
We also check the robustness of the results obtained in the previous section to the
inclusion of second-order polynomial terms of age (Tables XI- XIII) and the use of a
smaller bandwidth (Tables XVI-XVIII). Overall, the results are qualitatively similar to
those presented in section 4.3. Finally, we split the sample into two parts: respondents
who are enrolled in Medicare Part D and those enrolled in Medicare Part A, B or C to
re-estimate ACA’s effect. The results in Tables XX and XXIII show similar pattern of
the ACA’s effect on access to care.21
5 Discussion and Conclusion
The ACA has generated lots of media attention since 2009. An evaluation of this reform
on the US health care system is necessary to inform the debate on the importance of
the ACA. We develop and apply an identification strategy in a fuzzy difference-in-
discontinuities design to tease out the causal effect of the ACA on the accessibility to
care of the US population. Our identification results rely on the presence of a pooled
cross-sectional or panel data-set on which a “before-and-after” policy evaluation can be
applied. The partial effect of ACA or the policy of interest can be identified under a
very strict condition of equality in the treatment probability changes at the cutoff point.
In the case of the ACA, this condition is likely to be satisfied for the overall sample.
21We implement additional robustness checks by removing from the sample those individuals who turn
65 in the first half of 2014. The motivation for this additional check is that for most of our outcomes, the
information we use is from the 12 months previous to when the person was interviewed, and if the individual
turn 65 at the beginning of 2014, the effect that we are capturing may correspond to some event that more
likely happened in 2013 (instead of 2014). Tables XXVIII shows that for those outcomes related to the
alternative measures of access to care, the results are similar to those presented in section 4.3, and for the
other outcomes, the results have the same sign but we observe a decrease in their statistical significance.
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We apply our fuzzy difference-in-discontinuities method on self-reported access to care
outcomes, using the National Health Interview Survey over a 3-year period (2012-2014).
Our results show that the ACA has had an adverse impact on access to health
care services for costs reasons. In particular, under the ACA, the hazard of delaying
care, paying drugs prescription, seeing a specialist, or having a follow-up treatment has
increased because of affordability. These results suggest that an increasing number of
seniors (aged 65 or more) reported unmet health care needs for the lack of financial
resources. This must be a concern for policymakers as those who reported unmet
health care are more likely to have a high risk of mortality (Alonso et al., 1997) and to
experience deterioration in their health status (Okumura et al., 2013). Two mechanisms
might explain why the ACA increased cost-related barriers: it increased the demand
of health care services increasing coverage, and reduced the supply of health services
by replacing a fee-for-service (FFS) payment model under which care providers receive
a fee for each service provided to patients, with a capitation-based payment model,
where care providers are paid a fixed amount of money for each patient to provide a
bundle of pre-determined services.22 Note that a FFS scheme incentivizes providers
to increase the quantity of services provided (Mcguire, 2000). However, capitation
creates incentives to under-provide services and may improve the quality of services
(Scott, 2000). This implies that along with facilitating access to insurance coverage,
the ACA should have included measures or incentives to increase the supply of health
services and prevent the increase of insurer’s premiums and beneficiaries’ out-of-pocket
expenses. Our results also show that the ACA improved hospital stays for patients as
a result of moving away from an FFS payment system to a capitation payment system,
which could have rewarded quality instead of quantity.
Our results may be capturing short-term effects of the ACA in terms of access to
health care services. For example, if the ACA successfully increased the quality of care
through more preventive care services, the number of patients per physician might have
decreased progressively, reducing the demand for care as well as health care services
utilization This in turn could have reduced access to care issues. These effects could
be captured in the long-term effects. Even though estimating such effects will require
long panel data (which we do not have), our identification and estimation strategy will
still be valid.
22For more details, see the Public Law 111–148–MAR. 23, 2010 at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
PLAW-111publ148/pdf/PLAW-111publ148.pdf (accessed on September 2018).
20
References
Abadie, A. (2005). Semiparametric difference-in-differences estimators. The Review of
Economic Studies, 72 (1), 1–19.
Alonso, J., Orfila, F., Ruigomez, A., Ferrer, M. and Anto, J. M. (1997).
Unmet health care needs and mortality among spanish elderly. American Journal of
Public Health, 87 (3), 365–370, pMID: 9096535.
Benedetto, M. A. D. and Paola, M. D. (2018). Term Limit Extension And Electoral
Participation. Evidence From A Diff-In-Discontinuities Design At The Local Level In
Italy. Working Papers 201802, Universita della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia,
Statistica e Finanza ”Giovanni Anania” - DESF.
Calonico, S., Cattaneo, M. D. and Titiunik, R. (2014). Robust nonparametric
confidence intervals for regression-discontinuity designs. Econometrica, 82 (6), 2295–
2326.
Card, D., Dobkin, C. and Maestas, N. (2008). The impact of nearly universal
insurance coverage on health care utilization: evidence from medicare. American
Economic Review, 98 (5), 2242–58.
Cohen, R., Martinez, M. and Zammitti, E. (2016). Early release of selected esti-
mates based on data from the 2015 national health interview survey. National Center
for Health Statistics.
Courtemanche, C., Friedson, A., Koller, A. P. and Rees, D. I. (2017a). The
Affordable Care Act and Ambulance Response Times. Working Paper 23722, National
Bureau of Economic Research.
—, Marton, J., Ukert, B., Yelowitz, A. and Zapata, D. (2017b). Early impacts
of the affordable care act on health insurance coverage in medicaid expansion and
non-expansion states. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 36 (1), 178–210.
Crowder, M. (1991). On the identifiability crisis in competing risks analysis. Scandi-
navian Journal of Statistics, pp. 223–233.
— (2000). Characterizations of competing risks in terms of independent-risks proxy
models. Scandinavian journal of statistics, 27 (1), 57–64.
Fan, J. (1992). Design-adaptive nonparametric regression. Journal of the American
statistical Association, 87 (420), 998–1004.
Fine, J. P. and Gray, R. J. (1999). A proportional hazards model for the subdistri-
bution of a competing risk. Journal of the American statistical association, 94 (446),
496–509.
Frean, M., Gruber, J. and Sommers, B. D. (2017). Premium subsidies, the man-
date, and medicaid expansion: Coverage effects of the affordable care act. Journal of
Health Economics, 53, 72–86.
21
Gilraine, M. (2017). Multiple treatments from a single discontinuity: An application
to class size. Tech. rep., University of Toronto.
Grembi, V., Nannicini, T. and Troiano, U. (2016). Do fiscal rules matter? Amer-
ican Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 8 (3), 1–30.
Hahn, J., Todd, P. and Van der Klaauw, W. (2001). Identification and estimation
of treatment effects with a regression-discontinuity design. Econometrica, 69 (1),
201–209.
Imbens, G. and Kalyanaraman, K. (2012). Optimal bandwidth choice for the re-
gression discontinuity estimator. The Review of Economic Studies, 79 (3), 933–959.
Imbens, G. W. and Lemieux, T. (2008). Regression discontinuity designs: A guide
to practice. Journal of econometrics, 142 (2), 615–635.
Kachan, D., Fleming, L. E., Christ, S., Muennig, P., Prado, G., Tannenbaum,
S. L., Yang, X., Caban-M, A. J. and Lee, D. J. (2015). Health status of older
us workers and nonworkers, national health interview survey, 1997-2011. Preventing
Chronic Disease: Public Health Research, Practice, and Policy, p. 12.
Lee, D. S. and Lemieux, T. (2010). Regression discontinuity designs in economics.
Journal of economic literature, 48 (2), 281–355.
Leonardi, M. and Pica, G. (2013). Who pays for it? the heterogeneous wage effects
of employment protection legislation. The Economic Journal, 123.
Manchikanti, L., Ii, S. H., Benyamin, R. M. and Hirsch, J. A. (2017). A critical
analysis of obamacare: Affordable care or insurance for many and coverage for few?
Pain Physician, 20 (3), 111–138.
Mcguire, T. G. (2000). Chapter 9 - physician agency. In A. J. Culyer and J. P.
Newhouse (eds.), Handbook of Health Economics, Handbook of Health Economics,
vol. 1, Elsevier, pp. 461 – 536.
Obama, B. (2016). United states health care reform progress to date and next steps.
JAMA, 316 (5), 525–532.
Okumura, M., Hersh, A., Hilton, J. and Lotstein, D. (2013). Change in health
status and access to care in young adults with special health care needs: results from
the 2007 national survey of adult transition and health. Journal of adolescent health,
pp. 413–418.
Otsu, T., Xu, K.-L. and Matsushita, Y. (2015). Empirical likelihood for regression
discontinuity design. Journal of Econometrics, 186 (1), 94–112.
Porter, J. (2003). Estimation in the regression discontinuity model. Unpublished
Manuscript, Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin at Madison, pp.
1–66.
22
Scott, A. (2000). Economics of general practice. In A. J. Culyer and J. P. Newhouse
(eds.), Handbook of Health Economics, Handbook of Health Economics, vol. 1, 22,
Elsevier, pp. 1175–1200.
Sommers, B., Blendon, R., Orav, E. and Epstein, A. (2016). Changes in uti-
lization and health among low-income adults after medicaid expansion or expanded
private insurance. JAMA Internal Medicine, 176 (10), 1501–1509.
23
Figure I: Coverage by age: 2012 vs 2014
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Figure II: Employment by age: 2012 vs 2014
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Figure III: Coverage (part D) by age: 2012 vs 2014
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Figure IV: Coverage (parts A, B or C) by age: 2012 vs 2014
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Table I: Insurance Coverage
On Any Private 2+ Forms Managed
Medicare insurance coverage coverage care
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: RD Estimates at age 65 and year 2012
Overall sample 0.622∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗ -0.360∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.011) (0.023) (0.055) (0.049)
Observations 11772 11769 11823 11823 10465
Panel B: RD Estimates at age 65 and year 2014
Overall sample 0.641∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗ -0.311∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.013) (0.018) (0.051) (0.045)
Observations 13377 13375 13442 13442 12364
Panel C: Diff-in-discs Estimates
Overall sample 0.019 -0.044∗∗∗ -0.022 0.005 0.049
(0.022) (0.015) (0.019) (0.024) (0.043)
Observations 25149 25144 25265 25265 22829
Notes: All columns in Panels A and B report the RD estimates at age 65 using data
from Northeast, Midwest, and West regions and year 2012 (Panel A) and 2014 (panel B).
All columns in Panel C report the fuzzy diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast,
Midwest, and West regions, and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models
include quadratic controls for age, fully interacted with dummies for age 65 or older
and year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators for gender, race/ethnicity,
education and region. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by quarter of age.
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Table II: Access to Care
Panel A: Baseline measures
Delayed care Did not get Saw doctor Hospital stay
last year care last year last year last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall sample 0.036∗ 0.016 0.058 0.048∗
(0.020) (0.015) (0.038) (0.028)
Observations 25530 25530 10462 25504
Panel B: Alternative measures
Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t get
afford prescription afford to see a afford follow-up appointment soon
medicine last year specialist last year care last year enough last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall sample 0.070∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ -0.026
(0.025) (0.024) (0.015) (0.029)
Observations 12591 12588 12588 12596
Notes: All columns report the fuzzy diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast, Midwest, and West
regions, and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include linear control for age, fully
interacted with dummies for age 65 or older and year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators for
gender, race/ethnicity, education and region. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by quarter of age.
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Table III: Access to Care by Ethnicity
Panel A: Baseline measures
Delayed care Did not get Saw doctor Hospital stay
last year care last year last year last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
White non-Hispanic (all) 0.033 0.011 0.048 0.051∗
(0.023) (0.016) (0.042) (0.030)
Observations 18596 18596 7730 18577
Black non-Hispanic (all) -0.021 -0.069 0.367∗∗ -0.035
(0.100) (0.097) (0.165) (0.122)
Observations 1954 1954 884 1952
Hispanic (all) 0.132 0.156∗∗ -0.105 0.125
(0.089) (0.062) (0.125) (0.102)
Observations 2939 2939 1111 2936
Black or Hispanic (all) 0.066 0.059 0.107 0.056
(0.069) (0.052) (0.108) (0.080)
Observations 4893 4893 1995 4888
Non-White (all) 0.055 0.046 0.100 0.038
(0.052) (0.044) (0.101) (0.063)
Observations 6934 6934 2732 6927
Panel B: Alternative measures
Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t get
afford prescription afford to see a afford follow-up appointment soon
medicine last year specialist last year care last year enough last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
White non-Hispanic (all) 0.067∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗ -0.026
(0.027) (0.027) (0.017) (0.029)
Observations 9337 9335 9335 9343
Black non-Hispanic (all) -0.047 -0.028 0.046 -0.072
(0.190) (0.074) (0.056) (0.096)
Observations 1086 1086 1086 1085
Hispanic (all) 0.233∗ 0.086 0.153 0.040
(0.124) (0.103) (0.102) (0.083)
Observations 1322 1322 1323 1323
Black or Hispanic (all) 0.108 0.031 0.105∗ -0.011
(0.116) (0.060) (0.060) (0.073)
Observations 2408 2408 2409 2408
Non-White (all) 0.083 0.068 0.151∗∗∗ -0.017
(0.088) (0.045) (0.049) (0.058)
Observations 3254 3253 3253 3253
Notes: All columns report the fuzzy diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast, Midwest, and West regions,
and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include linear control for age, fully interacted with
dummies for age 65 or older and year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators for gender, race/ethnicity,
education and region. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only. Standard errors (in parentheses)
are clustered by quarter of age.
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Table IV: Access to Care by Education
Panel A: Baseline measures
Delayed care Did not get Saw doctor Hospital stay
last year care last year last year last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High school dropout 0.116 0.091 -0.057 0.064
(0.094) (0.082) (0.193) (0.111)
Observations 3385 3385 1268 3382
High school graduate 0.029 0.025 0.071 0.063
(0.058) (0.041) (0.090) (0.051)
Observations 7023 7023 2828 7016
At least some college 0.031 0.004 0.066 0.042
(0.025) (0.019) (0.046) (0.035)
Observations 15122 15122 6366 15106
Panel B: Alternative measures
Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t get
afford prescription afford to see a afford follow-up appointment soon
medicine last year specialist last year care last year enough last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High school dropout 0.132 0.228∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.105
(0.128) (0.131) (0.107) (0.100)
Observations 1602 1601 1601 1601
High school graduate -0.060 0.059 0.019 -0.065
(0.063) (0.046) (0.050) (0.059)
Observations 3357 3356 3356 3359
At least some college 0.114∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗ 0.041∗∗ -0.032
(0.030) (0.026) (0.020) (0.038)
Observations 7632 7631 7631 7636
Notes: All columns report the fuzzy diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast, Midwest, and West regions,
and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include linear control for age, fully interacted with
dummies for age 65 or older and year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators for gender, race/ethnicity,
education and region. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only. Standard errors (in parentheses)
are clustered by quarter of age.
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Table V: Access to Care by Ethnicity and Education
Panel A: Baseline measures
Delayed care Did not get Saw doctor Hospital stay
last year care last year last year last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
White non-Hispanic:
High school dropout 0.062 0.061 -0.234 0.260
(0.201) (0.159) (0.336) (0.198)
Observations 1366 1366 569 1365
High school graduate 0.061 0.039 0.089 0.079
(0.062) (0.046) (0.095) (0.054)
Observations 5230 5230 2095 5224
At least some college 0.021 -0.004 0.051 0.031
(0.027) (0.019) (0.048) (0.035)
Observations 12000 12000 5066 11988
Minority:
High school dropout 0.170 0.107 0.116 -0.051
(0.121) (0.116) (0.226) (0.129)
Observations 2019 2019 699 2017
High school graduate -0.115 -0.037 -0.000 -0.024
(0.113) (0.070) (0.149) (0.111)
Observations 1793 1793 733 1792
At least some college 0.094 0.054 0.141 0.120
(0.062) (0.057) (0.134) (0.101)
Observations 3122 3122 1300 3118
Panel B: Alternative measures
Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t get
afford prescription afford to see a afford follow-up appointment soon
medicine last year specialist last year care last year enough last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
White non-Hispanic:
High school dropout 0.078 0.309 0.321∗ 0.140
(0.255) (0.236) (0.183) (0.186)
Observations 723 722 722 724
High school graduate -0.077 0.054 0.010 -0.055
(0.066) (0.046) (0.055) (0.059)
Observations 2495 2495 2495 2496
At least some college 0.116∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗ 0.028 -0.029
(0.031) (0.028) (0.020) (0.039)
Observations 6119 6118 6118 6123
Minority:
High school dropout 0.133 0.210∗ 0.315∗∗ 0.094
(0.222) (0.115) (0.125) (0.086)
Observations 879 879 879 877
High school graduate 0.000 0.074 0.053 -0.090
(0.120) (0.110) (0.102) (0.108)
Observations 862 861 861 863
At least some college 0.105 0.005 0.130∗∗ -0.031
(0.109) (0.065) (0.060) (0.086)
Observations 1513 1513 1513 1513
Notes: All columns report the fuzzy diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast, Midwest, and West regions,
and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include linear control for age, fully interacted with
dummies for age 65 or older and year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators for gender, race/ethnicity,
education and region. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only. Standard errors (in parentheses)
are clustered by quarter of age.
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Table VI: Employment
Employed Full time
(1) (2)
Overall sample -0.020 -0.020
(0.039) (0.029)
Observations 25159 25265
Notes: All columns report the diff-in-discs estimates
using data from Northeast, Midwest, and West re-
gions, and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and
2014. The models include quadratic control for age,
fully interacted with dummies for age 65 or older and
year 2014. Other controls in models include indica-
tors for gender, race/ethnicity, education and region.
Samples for regression models include people ages 55-
75 only. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered
by quarter of age.
Table VII: Insurance Coverage by Ethnicity
On Any Private 2+ Forms Managed
Medicare insurance coverage coverage care
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
White non-Hispanic (all) 0.036 -0.054∗∗∗ -0.021 0.021 0.009
(0.025) (0.019) (0.022) (0.024) (0.045)
Observations 18319 18315 18387 18387 16938
Black non-Hispanic (all) 0.014 -0.007 0.054 -0.035 0.231
(0.100) (0.062) (0.092) (0.100) (0.149)
Observations 1920 1920 1935 1935 1703
Hispanic (all) -0.038 -0.062 -0.211∗∗∗ -0.040 0.127
(0.104) (0.049) (0.066) (0.101) (0.114)
Observations 2891 2890 2915 2915 2389
Black or Hispanic (all) -0.018 -0.042 -0.119∗∗ -0.033 0.163∗
(0.069) (0.037) (0.047) (0.072) (0.089)
Observations 4811 4810 4850 4850 4092
Non-White (all) -0.045 -0.023 -0.024 -0.056 0.201∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.025) (0.034) (0.058) (0.073)
Observations 6830 6829 6878 6878 5891
Notes: All columns report the diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast, Midwest,
and West regions, and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include
quadratic control for age, fully interacted with dummies for age 65 or older and year 2014.
Other controls in models include indicators for gender, race/ethnicity, education and region.
Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only. Standard errors (in parenthe-
ses) are clustered by quarter of age.
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Table VIII: Insurance Coverage by Education
On Any Private 2+ Forms Managed
Medicare insurance coverage coverage care
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High school dropout -0.029 -0.044 0.025 -0.029 0.152
(0.073) (0.071) (0.079) (0.076) (0.098)
Observations 3325 3324 3347 3347 2797
High school graduate -0.025 -0.062∗ -0.045 -0.073 0.086
(0.053) (0.036) (0.041) (0.058) (0.085)
Observations 6900 6898 6933 6933 6221
At least some college 0.051 -0.038∗∗ -0.028 0.047 0.021
(0.032) (0.017) (0.031) (0.031) (0.047)
Observations 14924 14922 14985 14985 13811
Notes: All columns report the diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast, Midwest,
and West regions, and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include
quadratic control for age, fully interacted with dummies for age 65 or older and year 2014.
Other controls in models include indicators for gender, race/ethnicity, education and region.
Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only. Standard errors (in parenthe-
ses) are clustered by quarter of age.
Table IX: Employment by Ethnicity
Employed Full time
(1) (2)
White non-Hispanic (all) -0.032 -0.035
(0.047) (0.038)
Observations 18330 18387
Black non-Hispanic (all) -0.148 -0.068
(0.101) (0.100)
Observations 1924 1935
Hispanic (all) 0.017 0.027
(0.075) (0.068)
Observations 2905 2915
Black or Hispanic (all) -0.050 -0.018
(0.063) (0.045)
Observations 4829 4850
Non-White (all) 0.020 0.029
(0.054) (0.042)
Observations 6829 6878
Notes: All columns report the diff-in-discs estimates
using data from Northeast, Midwest, and West re-
gions, and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and
2014. The models include quadratic control for age,
fully interacted with dummies for age 65 or older and
year 2014. Other controls in models include indica-
tors for gender, race/ethnicity, education and region.
Samples for regression models include people ages 55-
75 only. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered
by quarter of age.
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Table X: Employment by Education
Employed Full time
(1) (2)
High school dropout 0.006 -0.000
(0.077) (0.058)
Observations 3336 3347
High school graduate -0.022 -0.084
(0.073) (0.071)
Observations 6904 6933
At least some college -0.031 -0.004
(0.050) (0.039)
Observations 14919 14985
Notes: All columns report the diff-in-discs estimates using
data from Northeast, Midwest, and West regions, and com-
paring outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include
quadratic control for age, fully interacted with dummies for
age 65 or older and year 2014. Other controls in models in-
clude indicators for gender, race/ethnicity, education and re-
gion. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75
only. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by quarter
of age.
Table XI: Access to Care (with quadratic control for age)
Panel A: Baseline measures
Delayed care Did not get Saw doctor Hospital stay
last year care last year last year last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall sample 0.059∗ 0.036 0.010 0.043
(0.032) (0.024) (0.059) (0.037)
Observations 25530 25530 10462 25504
Panel B: Alternative measures
Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t get
afford prescription afford to see a afford follow-up appointment soon
medicine last year specialist last year care last year enough last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall sample 0.116∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗ 0.040∗ -0.078
(0.038) (0.039) (0.023) (0.047)
Observations 12591 12588 12588 12596
Notes: All columns report the fuzzy diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast, Midwest, and West
regions, and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include quadratic control for age,
fully interacted with dummies for age 65 or older and year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators
for gender, race/ethnicity, education and region. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75
only. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by quarter of age.
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Table XII: Access to Care by Ethnicity (with quadratic control for age)
Panel A: Baseline measures
Delayed care Did not get Saw doctor Hospital stay
last year care last year last year last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
White non-Hispanic (all) 0.051 0.039 0.010 0.067
(0.034) (0.024) (0.067) (0.042)
Observations 18596 18596 7730 18577
Black non-Hispanic (all) 0.154 -0.212 0.435 -0.121
(0.132) (0.175) (0.273) (0.192)
Observations 1954 1954 884 1952
Hispanic (all) 0.136 0.192∗ -0.492∗∗ 0.036
(0.159) (0.099) (0.220) (0.194)
Observations 2939 2939 1111 2936
Black or Hispanic (all) 0.140 0.014 -0.025 -0.035
(0.113) (0.095) (0.194) (0.138)
Observations 4893 4893 1995 4888
Non-White (all) 0.119 0.038 0.002 -0.073
(0.085) (0.080) (0.173) (0.109)
Observations 6934 6934 2732 6927
Panel B: Alternative measures
Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t get
afford prescription afford to see a afford follow-up appointment soon
medicine last year specialist last year care last year enough last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
White non-Hispanic (all) 0.123∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.044 -0.094∗∗
(0.036) (0.044) (0.027) (0.045)
Observations 9337 9335 9335 9343
Black non-Hispanic (all) -0.036 -0.010 -0.026 0.011
(0.364) (0.134) (0.087) (0.197)
Observations 1086 1086 1086 1085
Hispanic (all) 0.244 0.027 0.034 0.119
(0.241) (0.185) (0.194) (0.187)
Observations 1322 1322 1323 1323
Black or Hispanic (all) 0.122 0.010 0.005 0.090
(0.221) (0.103) (0.105) (0.155)
Observations 2408 2408 2409 2408
Non-White (all) 0.093 0.042 0.024 0.016
(0.164) (0.068) (0.067) (0.110)
Observations 3254 3253 3253 3253
Notes: All columns report the fuzzy diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast, Midwest, and West regions,
and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include quadratic control for age, fully interacted with
dummies for age 65 or older and year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators for gender, race/ethnicity,
education and region. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only. Standard errors (in parentheses)
are clustered by quarter of age.
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Table XIII: Access to Care by Education (with quadratic control for age)
Panel A: Baseline measures
Delayed care Did not get Saw doctor Hospital stay
last year care last year last year last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High school dropout 0.253 0.131 -0.790 -0.015
(0.179) (0.184) (0.536) (0.251)
Observations 3385 3385 1268 3382
High school graduate 0.009 0.083 -0.046 0.091∗
(0.089) (0.070) (0.123) (0.051)
Observations 7023 7023 2828 7016
At least some college 0.075∗ 0.009 0.111∗ 0.023
(0.038) (0.027) (0.059) (0.048)
Observations 15122 15122 6366 15106
Panel B: Alternative measures
Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t get
afford prescription afford to see a afford follow-up appointment soon
medicine last year specialist last year care last year enough last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High school dropout 0.132 0.228∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.105
(0.128) (0.131) (0.107) (0.100)
Observations 1602 1601 1601 1601
High school dropout 0.073 0.244 0.233 0.139
(0.301) (0.242) (0.174) (0.230)
Observations 1602 1601 1601 1601
High school graduate -0.060 0.059 0.019 -0.065
(0.063) (0.046) (0.050) (0.059)
Observations 3357 3356 3356 3359
High school graduate 0.029 0.114 0.033 -0.036
(0.102) (0.084) (0.081) (0.108)
Observations 3357 3356 3356 3359
At least some college 0.114∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗ 0.041∗∗ -0.032
(0.030) (0.026) (0.020) (0.038)
Observations 7632 7631 7631 7636
At least some college 0.148∗∗∗ 0.065 0.018 -0.118∗∗
(0.042) (0.040) (0.029) (0.056)
Observations 7632 7631 7631 7636
Notes: All columns report the fuzzy diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast, Midwest, and West
regions, and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include quadratic control for age, fully
interacted with dummies for age 65 or older and year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators for
gender, race/ethnicity, education and region. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by quarter of age.
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Table XIV: Insurance Coverage (smaller bandwidth)
On Any Private 2+ Forms Managed
Medicare insurance coverage coverage care
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Overall sample 0.017 -0.046∗∗∗ -0.035∗ 0.000 0.052
(0.021) (0.015) (0.019) (0.023) (0.042)
Observations 12677 12674 12729 12729 11570
Classified by ethnicity:
White non-Hispanic (all) 0.036 -0.039∗∗ -0.025 0.019 0.013
(0.024) (0.015) (0.020) (0.024) (0.043)
Observations 9376 9373 9411 9411 8690
Black non-Hispanic (all) 0.015 -0.053 0.021 -0.054 0.122
(0.096) (0.056) (0.092) (0.096) (0.143)
Observations 904 904 908 908 813
Hispanic (all) -0.069 -0.106∗∗ -0.205∗∗∗ -0.070 0.231∗∗
(0.100) (0.050) (0.063) (0.097) (0.111)
Observations 1393 1393 1400 1400 1172
Black or Hispanic (all) -0.037 -0.090∗∗ -0.126∗∗ -0.060 0.182∗∗
(0.067) (0.034) (0.047) (0.066) (0.085)
Observations 2297 2297 2308 2308 1985
Non-White (all) -0.060 -0.065∗∗ -0.045 -0.070 0.212∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.025) (0.037) (0.055) (0.071)
Observations 3301 3301 3318 3318 2880
Classified by education:
High school dropout -0.017 -0.078 0.038 -0.023 0.172∗
(0.071) (0.073) (0.082) (0.074) (0.096)
Observations 1569 1569 1576 1576 1340
High school graduate -0.041 -0.068∗∗ -0.085∗∗ -0.090 0.078
(0.052) (0.032) (0.041) (0.055) (0.082)
Observations 3288 3286 3306 3306 2967
At least some college 0.050∗ -0.030∗ -0.028 0.045 0.029
(0.030) (0.016) (0.029) (0.031) (0.046)
Observations 7820 7819 7847 7847 7263
Notes: All columns report the diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast, Midwest, and West
regions, and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include linear control for age,
fully interacted with dummies for age 65 or older and year 2014. Other controls in models include
indicators for gender, race/ethnicity, education and region. Samples for regression models include
people ages 60-70 only. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by quarter of age.
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Table XV: Employment (smaller bandwidth)
Employed Full time
(1) (2)
Overall sample -0.019 -0.020
(0.037) (0.028)
Observations 12687 12729
Classified by ethnicity:
White non-Hispanic (all) -0.029 -0.037
(0.046) (0.035)
Observations 9387 9411
Black non-Hispanic (all) -0.130 -0.085
(0.103) (0.099)
Observations 903 908
Hispanic (all) 0.010 0.061
(0.079) (0.069)
Observations 1397 1400
Black or Hispanic (all) -0.046 -0.001
(0.062) (0.044)
Observations 2300 2308
Non-White (all) 0.013 0.035
(0.054) (0.041)
Observations 3300 3318
Classified by education:
High school dropout 0.003 0.004
(0.072) (0.053)
Observations 1573 1576
High school graduate -0.023 -0.083
(0.070) (0.067)
Observations 3287 3306
At least some college -0.026 -0.002
(0.049) (0.037)
Observations 7827 7847
Notes: All columns report the diff-in-discs estimates using
data from Northeast, Midwest, and West regions, and com-
paring outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include
linear control for age, fully interacted with dummies for age
65 or older and year 2014. Other controls in models include
indicators for gender, race/ethnicity, education and region.
Samples for regression models include people ages 60-70 only.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by quarter of
age.
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Table XVI: Access to Care (smaller bandwidth)
Panel A: Baseline measures
Delayed care Did not get Saw doctor Hospital stay
last year care last year last year last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall sample 0.050∗ 0.027 0.031 0.015
(0.029) (0.021) (0.052) (0.034)
Observations 13294 13294 5607 13288
Panel B: Alternative measures
Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t get
afford prescription afford to see a afford follow-up appointment soon
medicine last year specialist last year care last year enough last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall sample 0.083∗∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.038∗ -0.055
(0.031) (0.035) (0.021) (0.043)
Observations 6724 6723 6722 6724
Notes: All columns report the fuzzy diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast, Midwest, and West
regions, and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include linear control for age, fully
interacted with dummies for age 65 or older and year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators for
gender, race/ethnicity, education and region. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by quarter of age.
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Table XVII: Access to Care by Ethnicity (smaller bandwidth)
Panel A: Baseline measures
Delayed care Did not get Saw doctor Hospital stay
last year care last year last year last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
White non-Hispanic (all) 0.045 0.026 0.028 0.025
(0.032) (0.023) (0.059) (0.038)
Observations 9801 9801 4176 9797
Black non-Hispanic (all) 0.143 -0.120 0.380 -0.123
(0.130) (0.168) (0.300) (0.171)
Observations 965 965 438 964
Hispanic (all) 0.117 0.171∗ -0.272 0.096
(0.141) (0.089) (0.177) (0.173)
Observations 1468 1468 594 1468
Black or Hispanic (all) 0.124 0.046 0.021 0.009
(0.104) (0.091) (0.180) (0.119)
Observations 2433 2433 1032 2432
Non-White (all) 0.086 0.044 0.039 -0.027
(0.077) (0.073) (0.160) (0.097)
Observations 3493 3493 1431 3491
Panel B: Alternative measures
Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t get
afford prescription afford to see a afford follow-up appointment soon
medicine last year specialist last year care last year enough last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
White non-Hispanic (all) 0.069∗∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.031 -0.067
(0.030) (0.042) (0.026) (0.042)
Observations 5023 5022 5021 5025
Black non-Hispanic (all) 0.086 0.013 0.021 -0.058
(0.337) (0.111) (0.079) (0.166)
Observations 539 539 539 538
Hispanic (all) 0.322 0.090 0.102 0.129
(0.210) (0.163) (0.162) (0.137)
Observations 707 707 707 707
Black or Hispanic (all) 0.209 0.052 0.054 0.059
(0.199) (0.090) (0.090) (0.129)
Observations 1246 1246 1246 1245
Non-White (all) 0.167 0.080 0.083 0.016
(0.149) (0.061) (0.059) (0.092)
Observations 1701 1701 1701 1699
Notes: All columns report the fuzzy diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast, Midwest, and West regions, and
comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include linear control for age, fully interacted with dummies
for age 65 or older and year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators for gender, race/ethnicity, education and
region. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by
quarter of age.
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Table XVIII: Access to Care by Education (smaller bandwidth)
Panel A: Baseline measures
Delayed care Did not get Saw doctor Hospital stay
last year care last year last year last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High school dropout 0.177 0.109 -0.285 -0.065
(0.162) (0.142) (0.343) (0.203)
Observations 1651 1651 636 1651
High school graduate 0.000 0.066 0.063 0.097∗
(0.086) (0.064) (0.121) (0.057)
Observations 3454 3454 1448 3450
At least some college 0.061∗ 0.003 0.049 -0.011
(0.034) (0.025) (0.057) (0.044)
Observations 8189 8189 3523 8187
Panel B: Alternative measures
Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t get
afford prescription afford to see a afford follow-up appointment soon
medicine last year specialist last year care last year enough last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High school dropout -0.026 0.271 0.324∗∗ 0.166
(0.225) (0.165) (0.138) (0.181)
Observations 802 801 801 802
High school graduate 0.007 0.106 0.044 -0.026
(0.092) (0.074) (0.080) (0.105)
Observations 1697 1697 1697 1697
At least some college 0.123∗∗∗ 0.059 0.007 -0.086
(0.039) (0.040) (0.028) (0.052)
Observations 4225 4225 4224 4225
Notes: All columns report the fuzzy diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast, Midwest, and West
regions, and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include linear control for age, fully
interacted with dummies for age 65 or older and year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators for
gender, race/ethnicity, education and region. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by quarter of age.
Table XIX: Insurance Coverage (part D)
On Medicare part D
(1)
Overall sample 0.038
(0.029)
Observations 25149
Notes: All columns report the diff-in-discs estimates using data
from Northeast, Midwest, and West regions, and comparing out-
comes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include quadratic
control for age, fully interacted with dummies for age 65 or older
and year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators for
gender, race/ethnicity, education and region. Samples for regres-
sion models include people ages 55-75 only. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered by quarter of age.
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Table XX: Access to Care (part D)
Panel A: Baseline measures
Delayed care Did not get Saw doctor Hospital stay
last year care last year last year last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall sample 0.096∗ 0.042 0.165 0.143∗
(0.057) (0.040) (0.103) (0.074)
Observations 25530 25530 10462 25504
Panel B: Alternative measures
Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t get
afford prescription afford to see a afford follow-up appointment soon
medicine last year specialist last year care last year enough last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall sample 0.188∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ -0.065
(0.069) (0.066) (0.042) (0.082)
Observations 12591 12588 12588 12596
Notes: All columns report the fuzzy diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast, Midwest, and West
regions, and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include linear control for age, fully
interacted with dummies for age 65 or older and year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators for
gender, race/ethnicity, education and region. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by quarter of age.
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Table XXI: Access to Care by Ethnicity (part D)
Panel A: Baseline measures
Delayed care Did not get Saw doctor Hospital stay
last year care last year last year last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
White non-Hispanic (all) 0.097 0.031 0.148 0.157∗
(0.066) (0.047) (0.110) (0.084)
Observations 18596 18596 7730 18577
Black non-Hispanic (all) 0.167 -0.168 0.958 -0.080
(0.400) (0.318) (0.763) (0.407)
Observations 1954 1954 884 1952
Hispanic (all) 0.244 0.337∗∗ -0.210 0.302
(0.218) (0.153) (0.434) (0.236)
Observations 2939 2939 1111 2936
Black or Hispanic (all) 0.162 0.144 0.239 0.159
(0.184) (0.137) (0.363) (0.206)
Observations 4893 4893 1995 4888
Non-White (all) 0.117 0.101 0.287 0.101
(0.128) (0.107) (0.327) (0.151)
Observations 6934 6934 2732 6927
Panel B: Alternative measures
Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t get
afford prescription afford to see a afford follow-up appointment soon
medicine last year specialist last year care last year enough last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
White non-Hispanic (all) 0.181∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗ -0.067
(0.075) (0.077) (0.046) (0.081)
Observations 9337 9335 9335 9343
Black non-Hispanic (all) -0.116 0.056 0.327 -0.361
(0.885) (0.340) (0.327) (0.522)
Observations 1086 1086 1086 1085
Hispanic (all) 0.566∗ 0.298 0.439∗ 0.090
(0.338) (0.267) (0.257) (0.207)
Observations 1322 1322 1323 1323
Black or Hispanic (all) 0.291 0.087 0.315∗ -0.029
(0.337) (0.163) (0.164) (0.201)
Observations 2408 2408 2409 2408
Non-White (all) 0.208 0.183 0.428∗∗∗ -0.020
(0.242) (0.123) (0.145) (0.158)
Observations 3254 3253 3253 3253
Notes: All columns report the fuzzy diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast, Midwest, and West regions,
and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include linear control for age, fully interacted with
dummies for age 65 or older and year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators for gender, race/ethnicity,
education and region. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only. Standard errors (in parentheses)
are clustered by quarter of age.
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Table XXII: Insurance Coverage (parts A, B or C)
On Medicare part D
(1)
Overall sample 0.012
(0.027)
Observations 20070
Notes: All columns report the diff-in-discs estimates using data
from Northeast, Midwest, and West regions, and comparing out-
comes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include quadratic
control for age, fully interacted with dummies for age 65 or older
and year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators for
gender, race/ethnicity, education and region. Samples for regres-
sion models include people ages 55-75 only. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered by quarter of age.
Table XXIII: Access to Care (parts A, B or C)
Panel A: Baseline measures
Delayed care Did not get Saw doctor Hospital stay
last year care last year last year last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall sample 0.028 -0.005 0.074 0.042
(0.024) (0.017) (0.048) (0.030)
Observations 20346 20346 8296 20328
Panel B: Alternative measures
Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t get
afford prescription afford to see a afford follow-up appointment soon
medicine last year specialist last year care last year enough last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall sample 0.090∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗ 0.041∗∗ -0.060
(0.028) (0.026) (0.018) (0.037)
Observations 9767 9765 9765 9772
Notes: All columns report the fuzzy diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast, Midwest, and West
regions, and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include linear control for age, fully
interacted with dummies for age 65 or older and year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators for
gender, race/ethnicity, education and region. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by quarter of age.
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Table XXIV: Access to Care by Ethnicity (parts A, B or C)
Panel A: Baseline measures
Delayed care Did not get Saw doctor Hospital stay
last year care last year last year last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
White non-Hispanic (all) 0.030 -0.007 0.040 0.049
(0.026) (0.017) (0.056) (0.034)
Observations 14759 14759 6123 14745
Black non-Hispanic (all) -0.020 -0.089 0.501∗∗∗ -0.005
(0.129) (0.147) (0.182) (0.143)
Observations 1553 1553 686 1552
Hispanic (all) 0.068 0.106 0.024 0.034
(0.130) (0.083) (0.153) (0.119)
Observations 2396 2396 896 2395
Black or Hispanic (all) 0.034 0.019 0.241∗∗ 0.006
(0.075) (0.078) (0.113) (0.082)
Observations 3949 3949 1582 3947
Non-White (all) 0.026 0.010 0.214∗ 0.014
(0.067) (0.068) (0.112) (0.062)
Observations 5587 5587 2173 5583
Panel B: Alternative measures
Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t get
afford prescription afford to see a afford follow-up appointment soon
medicine last year specialist last year care last year enough last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
White non-Hispanic (all) 0.075∗∗ 0.055∗ 0.016 -0.066∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.018) (0.036)
Observations 7252 7251 7251 7258
Black non-Hispanic (all) 0.109 0.012 0.058 -0.072
(0.158) (0.097) (0.079) (0.108)
Observations 819 819 819 818
Hispanic (all) 0.287∗ 0.142 0.178 0.056
(0.155) (0.156) (0.165) (0.112)
Observations 1035 1035 1036 1036
Black or Hispanic (all) 0.214∗ 0.086 0.125 -0.002
(0.113) (0.087) (0.087) (0.101)
Observations 1854 1854 1855 1854
Non-White (all) 0.168∗ 0.096 0.163∗∗ -0.017
(0.087) (0.061) (0.064) (0.081)
Observations 2515 2514 2514 2514
Notes: All columns report the fuzzy diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast, Midwest, and West regions,
and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include linear control for age, fully interacted with
dummies for age 65 or older and year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators for gender, race/ethnicity,
education and region. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only. Standard errors (in parentheses)
are clustered by quarter of age.
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Table XXV: Access to Care in Midwest and South Regions (placebo test)
Panel A: Baseline measures
Delayed care Did not get Saw doctor Hospital stay
last year care last year last year last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall sample 0.003 -0.004 0.071 0.023
(0.022) (0.017) (0.046) (0.026)
Observations 22622 22622 9377 22597
Panel B: Alternative measures
Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t get
afford prescription afford to see a afford follow-up appointment soon
medicine last year specialist last year care last year enough last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall sample -0.033 -0.033 -0.027 -0.036
(0.031) (0.026) (0.019) (0.025)
Observations 11349 11343 11345 11351
Notes: All columns report the fuzzy diff-in-discs estimates using data from Midwest and South regions,
and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include linear control for age, fully interacted
with dummies for age 65 or older and year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators for gender,
race/ethnicity, education and region. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered by quarter of age.
Table XXVI: Access to Care in South Region (placebo test)
Panel A: Baseline measures
Delayed care Did not get Saw doctor Hospital stay
last year care last year last year last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall sample -0.003 0.001 0.019 -0.021
(0.031) (0.022) (0.060) (0.034)
Observations 14417 14417 5935 14404
Panel B: Alternative measures
Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t get
afford prescription afford to see a afford follow-up appointment soon
medicine last year specialist last year care last year enough last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall sample -0.078∗∗ -0.080∗∗ -0.055∗∗ -0.021
(0.034) (0.031) (0.024) (0.026)
Observations 7196 7192 7193 7197
Notes: All columns report the fuzzy diff-in-discs estimates using data from the South region, and comparing
outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include linear control for age, fully interacted with dummies
for age 65 or older and year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators for gender, race/ethnicity,
education and region. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered by quarter of age.
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Table XXVII: Access to Care between 2009 and 2013 (placebo test)
Panel A: Baseline measures
Delayed care Did not get Saw doctor Hospital stay
last year care last year last year last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2012 vs. 2013:
Overall sample -0.011 -0.010 0.008 -0.028
(0.020) (0.017) (0.033) (0.033)
Observations 23719 23719 9649 23694
2011 vs. 2012:
Overall sample -0.015 -0.023 0.005 -0.007
(0.023) (0.018) (0.035) (0.036)
Observations 22766 22766 9230 22750
2010 vs. 2011:
Overall sample 0.010 0.012 0.008 -0.013
(0.027) (0.017) (0.042) (0.030)
Observations 19742 19742 7787 19728
2009 vs. 2010:
Overall sample -0.014 0.014 -0.017 0.003
(0.027) (0.018) (0.045) (0.028)
Observations 17612 17612 6854 17594
Panel B: Alternative measures
Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t get
afford prescription afford to see a afford follow-up appointment soon
medicine last year specialist last year care last year enough last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2012 vs. 2013:
Overall sample 0.021 -0.002 0.025 -0.038∗
(0.027) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Observations 11700 11698 11695 11707
2011 vs. 2012:
Overall sample -0.016 -0.008 -0.002 0.013
(0.023) (0.020) (0.017) (0.027)
Observations 11201 11193 11194 11204
2010 vs. 2011:
Overall sample -0.043 -0.040∗∗ 0.000 0.006
(0.027) (0.015) (.) (0.028)
Observations 9573 5372 5373 9571
2009 vs. 2010:
Overall sample 0.043 0.000 0.000 -0.006
(0.027) (.) (.) (0.028)
Observations 9573 5372 5373 9571
Notes: All columns report the fuzzy diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast, Midwest, and West
regions, and comparing outcomes between years 2009 vs. 2010, 2010 vs. 2011, 2011 vs. 2012, and 2012
vs. 2013. The models include linear control for age, fully interacted with dummies for age 65 or older and
year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators for gender, race/ethnicity, education and region.
Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered
by quarter of age.
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Table XXVIII: Access to Care (without those individuals who turn 65 in the first
half of 2014)
Panel A: Baseline measures
Delayed care Did not get Saw doctor Hospital stay
last year care last year last year last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall sample 0.022 0.011 0.063 0.042
(0.020) (0.015) (0.040) (0.027)
Observations 25193 25193 10297 25167
Panel B: Alternative measures
Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t Couldn’t get
afford prescription afford to see a afford follow-up appointment soon
medicine last year specialist last year care last year enough last year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall sample 0.064∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ -0.032
(0.027) (0.024) (0.015) (0.030)
Observations 12404 12401 12401 12409
Notes: All columns report the fuzzy diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast, Midwest, and West
regions, and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include linear control for age, fully
interacted with dummies for age 65 or older and year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators
for gender, race/ethnicity, education and region. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75
only, and remove from the sample the individuals who turn 65 in the first half of 2014. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered by quarter of age.
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